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The conversion of the United States to war has given us an economy
with characteristics quite unlike those of the years of peace. This
paper deals with aspects of that economy. It is primarily concerned
with price relations prevailing in 1943 and with the physical inter-
changes of goods and services that are conditioned by price relations.
Before we trace the changes that came with transition from peace to
war we characterize in summary fashion the economy of the United
States in the year when the European war broke out. The period
1912-14 is the standard of reference.
OUTPUT OF COMMODITIES







1912-14 to 1939. During this quarter century the output of physical
goods increased about 25 per cent per capita of the population. Na-
tional income estimates indicate an advance of 60 to 70 per cent in
the over-all output of goods and services, and of 20 to 25 per cent per
capita of the population. These were substantial gains, won during a
period troubled by world wars and world-wide economic disturbances.
PRODUCTIVITY
Over the quarter century between 1914 and 1939 the effectiveness
of labor and management in production had increased at a rate prob-
ably surpassing that of any similar period in our industrial history.
In 1939 physical output per man-hour in manufacturing industries
was approximately 120 per cent greater than in 1914. The amount of
labor time that could produce 100 units in 1914 could in 1939 pro-
duce 220 units. The basis of this gain is to be found in greater tech-
nical knowledge, improved organization, a better trained labor force,
better equipment, and fuller use of mechanical power. For non-
manufacturing industries we have less accurate measurements of pro-
ductivity changes. In agriculture the increase in output per worker
between 1913 and 1938 may be estimated at 50 per cent, in mineral
100 per cent. Productivity per man-hour in railroad trans-
portation (freight and passenger operations combined) also increased
more than 100 per cent between 1914 and 1939.
3USES OF PRODUCTIVE RESOURCES
The year 1939 was one of industrial expansion. The level of indus-
trial activity was about 20 per cent higher than in 1938, but slightly
below the levels of 1929 and 1937. The failure to match the 1929
peak is the more noteworthy be,cause of an increase of some 10 million
in population between 1929 and 1939. As of August 1, 1939, approx-
imately 9 million persons were unemployed in the United States,
about one-sixth of the total labor force. Employment in all economic
activities was substantially higher than it had been in the early and
middle 'thirties but lower than in 1929. In effect, we were operating
in 1939 with a working force that excluded not only some two mil-
lion of those who had been employed in 1929, but also excluded the
net additions contributed by a growing population to the available
labor Our human productive power and our productive ma-
chine as a whole were being under-utijized in 1939. They had poten-
tial efficiency far above the demands placed upon them.2
The decade of the was distinctive, also, in the relation be-
1Totalwage-earner man-hours worked in manufacturing plants in 1939wereabout 22
per cent less than the number worked in 1929. In absolute terms the decline amounted to
over 4 billion man-hours.
2 This fact is clearly revealed if we compare the changes in manufacturing productivity
and in total manufacturing output that took place during two decades, the 'twenties and
'thirties (Solomon Fabricant, Employment in .Manujacturing, 1899-1939, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1942, P. 331). An increase in industrial productivity releases
productive energy.Such released energy may be used to increase the total volume of
production or may be assigned to leisure, voluntary or forced. In the decade 1919-29 the
released energy was largely devoted to the increase of total production. The increase of
Change in: 1919-19291929-1939
Output per man-hour in manufacturing +72 +32
Total manufacturing output +64 +3
Change in number of wage-earner hours
expended per unit of product —43 —24
72 per cent in man-hour efficiency contributed to an over.all increase of 64 per cent in
total output. The energy released between 1929 and 1939 by a 32 per cent gain in pro-
ductivity was not devoted to increased production.Total output rose only 3 per cent.
The released energy was turned loose (for leisure or for employment in nonmanufactur-
ing industries).Other evidence indicates that some of the released energy went to
other industries, but that a substantial part went into unemployment (enforced leisure)
and into a shorter working week (voluntary leisure).
The choice between enhanced production and greater leisure is not necessarily a
conscious decision.Institutional circumstances, the play of cyclical forces, labor legis-
lation, and many other factors influence the use of productive resources and determine
whether higher man-hour productivity is to lead to greater total output or to mOre
leisure. When the work week is shortened there is a clear choice of leisure rather than
additional goods.More often the consequences of given actions are not clearly fore-
seen; e.g., when effective demand is reduced by the maintenance of high selling prices
on services or goods.
4tween consumption goods and capital goods in the national product.
Between 1929 and 1939 total consumer outlay, in dollars of constant
purchasing power, increased about 8 per cent. Since population also
increased 8 per cent, consumers held their own between these
two dates. The record is quite different for capital goods. On the
average, for the ten years 1929-38, net capital formation constituted 3
per cent of the national income. In no other decade in a record going
back to 1879 did this percentage fall below In dollars of constant
purchasing power, net capital formation for the 1929-38 decade con-
stituted some 23 per of the figure for 19 19-28. The absolute
addition to capital in the decade 1929-38 was the lowest of any
decade from 1879 to 1938. The under-utilization of our productive
resources in this period was primarily a failure to create new indus-
trial plants and equipment. Current consumptive needs were being
met, but we were falling behind sharply in the building up of plant
and equipment with which to produce more goods.4 The estimated
increase of 32 per cent in man-hour productivity in manufacturing in
this decade is the more remarkable in the light of the retarded expan-
sion in industrial equipment.
When we compare the terminal years, 1929 and 1939, it is clear
that the decade was one of arrested development, so far as volume
of final product goes. But to say this, and ignore the difficulties over-
come, is to give a quite inadequate account of the accomplishments
of these years. In the face of adverse forces that swept the world the
level of consumer well-being had been maintained, our industrial
plant preserved, and we had made technical advances greatly en-
hancing industrial productivity and containing the seeds of a vastly
increased output.
PRICE RELATIONS
Between 1914 and 1939 there were widely dispersive movements
among the elements of the price system (Table 1 and Chart 1). A
relatively slight advance in wholesale prices was accompanied by a
considerable increase in living costs, a greater increase in construction
costs, and a very great advance in the hourly earnings of wage earners
in manufacturing industries. The terms on which goods and services
8SimonKuznets, Uses of National Income in Peace and War, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Occasional Paper 6, p. 31.
4Thisstatement is based, of course, on a quantitative record.Qualitative improve.
ments offset, in part, the quantitative deficiencies. We know that the replacements of
outworn equipment during this decade were more efficient than the discarded elements.
5are exchanged, terms which had remained relatively unchanged dur-
ing the several decades preceding 1914, suffered violent alterations
between 1914 and 1939, with profound implications for the working
of the economy and the distribution of its products.
TABLE 1
Price Trends in the United States, 1912-14 to 1939
Sept. 1938- Aug.
1912-14 Aug. 1939 1939
'Wholesale prices 100 111 109
Cost of living, industrial workers 141 140
Construction costs 100 207 208
Per capita earnings, mfg. labor 100 200 204
Hourly earnings, mfg. labor 100 281 279
Sources: The index of construction costs is that of the American Appraisal Company;
all other measurements are derived from indexes of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
These changes have been discussed in detail in other National Bu-
reau publications.5 We note here that the 1939 price structure, meas-
ured by 1914 standards, was characterized by low prices to primary
producers, high prices for the services of fabrication agents, and
high prices of finished goods, whether bought for use as capital
equipment or for consumption. In unit exchange values farmers lost
in relative position, other primary producers held their own, approx-
imately, while manufacturing workers and others engaged in fabrica-
tional processes gained substantially.
Consumers as a broad class had gained during this quarter century.
Consumption was more varied and living standards were higher in
1939 than in 1914. However, these gains of consumers are to be
appraised with reference to the extraordinary advances in industrial
productivity between 1914 and 1939. Had the potentialities released
by these gains been realized to the full the real income of consumers
in 1939 could have been substantially higher than it was. When ac-
count is taken of the great advances in technical efficiency there can
be no doubt that the prices of consumer goods were high in 1939.6
5TheAnatomy of Prices, 1890-1940, Bulletin .80, Sept. 9, 1940; also Prices in Reces-
sion and Recovery, 1936.
6 Some of the potential gains of the period 1914-39 were realized by consumers, as
shown in the records previously presented.It is not possible to say in detail just where
the remainder went, but we know something about the matter.Increased leisure ob-
tained through a general shortening of the working week has been mentioned.Educa-
tional facilities were extended and the average period of education lengthened. In
addition, there were many outright losses of real and potential wealth. During the
decade beginning in 1914 there was a great dissipation of wealth through war and
post-war disorganization. There was the sheer destruction of wealth that might have
been realized in the form of productive equipment. There were losses through foreign
debts that were never repaid.The speculative booms of the 'twenties absorbed energies
that might have been productively employed.In the 'thirties great losses were suffered
6CHARTI
Relations among Elements of the Price Structure
September 1938 — August 1939
(1912 —14 = ioo)
through prolonged depression and incomplete utilization of our productive resources.
The necessary support of unemployed workers and the payment of subsidies to pro-
ducing groups that were unfavorably affected by world-wide economic demoralization
served to lower the real returns of consumers at large.There were, besides, the familiar
distributive wastes arising out of duplicated services.In some of the rapidly expanding
areas of governmental activity, federal, state and local, there were wastes paralleling
the duplications and inefficiencies of some business operations. The forms of loss varied,
but both the 'twenties and the 'thirties contributed to the dissipation of potential pro-
ductive resources.Extraordinary productivity gains provided a rich margin for our
generation to play with.That between 1914 and 1939weimproved our position as
consumers and added substantially to our stock of productive equipment, despite our
economic sins of omission and commission, is evidence of the richness of the vein we
had struck.
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